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ABSTRACT 
 
After the 2008 financial crisis, reforms to financial regulation 
in the United States developed with an apparent contradiction at 
their core:  While those reforms embraced cooperative international 
measures, they simultaneously imposed more stringent safeguards 
on foreign banks opening on American soil.  In short, they both 
ceded and guarded domestic control over U.S. financial regulatory 
policy.  
This Comment examines that contradiction from 2008 to 
2010, including through Basel III negotiations and the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and attempts to 
explain the contradiction using an extended rational institutionalist 
account of international policy development.  The domestic actors 
responsible for U.S. foreign financial policy held distinct preferences 
for financial reform; when one actor exerted greater control over an 
institutional locus of the reform process, that actor’s preferences 
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dominated.  The resulting legislation provides a clear demonstration 
of the explanatory power of domestic politics for international legal 
and policy outcomes—even in the absence of public attention. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION:  DOMESTIC FINANCIAL REGULATION BEYOND THE 
WATER’S EDGE 
 
Midway through the 2008 U.S. Presidential campaign, America’s 
financial house caught fire.  Responding to shoddy underwriting 
practices and a wave of mortgage defaults, U.S. home prices fell by 
almost ten percent,1 and mortgage delinquency rates doubled in less 
than a year.2  Collateral calls led to the near-collapse of Bear Stearns, 
one of the country’s oldest investment banks, which JPMorgan 
Chase purchased in a government-assisted fire-sale.3  After seventy-
three consecutive months of economic growth, the United States 
was in recession.4 
Just nine days after Bear Stearns announced it was closing its 
doors, Senator and Presidential candidate Barack Obama gave a 
speech in New York City outlining six principles for repairing the 
American financial system.  Before an audience of the most senior 
executives in the U.S. banking industry, he dedicated a large portion 
of his speech to international—not domestic—financial regulation.  
“As we reform our regulatory system at home,” he said: 
 
we should work with international arrangements, like the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International 
Accounting Standards Board, and the Financial Stability Fo-
rum, to address the same problems abroad.  The goal should 
be to ensure that financial institutions around the world are 
subject to similar rules of the road, both to make the system 
more stable and to keep our financial institutions 
                                               
1 Fed. Reserve Econ. Database [FRED], S&P/Case–Shiller U.S. National Home 
Price Index, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Dec. 26, 2017), https://fred.stlou-
isfed.org/series/CSUSHPINSA [https://perma.cc/8NN3-65HD]. 
2 FRED, Delinquency Rate on Single–Family Residential Mortgages, Booked in Do-
mestic Offices, All Commercial Banks, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DRSFRMACBS [https://perma.cc/R87U-
PCME]. 
3 Associated Press, JPMorgan to Buy Bear Stearns for $2 a Share, NBC NEWS (Mar. 
17, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/23662433/ns/business-us_busi-
ness/t/jpmorgan-buy-bear-stearns-share [https://perma.cc/WG6Y-EK8T]. 
4 Bus. Cycle Dating Comm., Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Determination of 
the December 2007 Peak in Economic Activity, (Dec. 11, 2008), 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html [https://perma.cc/8WN2-VUKX]. 
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competitive.5 
 
Even in an election year, Obama’s support for these international 
arrangements—where regulators in different countries agreed to 
embrace common standards—was not a strictly partisan issue.  As 
Obama spoke, President George W. Bush coordinated a wide array 
of market support programs across the G20 countries.6  “I'm a mar-
ket-oriented guy,” he would later comment, “but not when I'm faced 
with the prospect of a global meltdown.”7  Bush appointees fol-
lowed similar maxims.  Just two years earlier, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke (whom Bush appointed) had negotiated 
and advocated strongly for domestic implementation of the Basel II 
capital accords, saying that “international cooperation and con-
sistency” on large-bank regulation “remains very much in the inter-
est of the United States.”8 
Skeptics of international financial regulation also resided on 
both sides of the aisle.  Earlier in March 2008, Treasury Secretary 
Hank Paulson released a “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial 
Regulatory Structure,” which mentioned the Basel Committee only 
as an example of “jurisdictional disputes” that “hinde[r] the intro-
duction of new products” and “slo[w] innovation.”9  Even Daniel 
                                               
5 Barack Obama, Presidential Candidate, Speech at Cooper Union: Renewing 
the American Economy (Mar. 27, 2008), http://www.ny-
times.com/2008/03/27/us/politics/27text-obama.html 
[https://perma.cc/HTD7-GTQ8], in Obama on “Reviving the Economy”, N.Y. TIMES.   
6 Jeremy Pelofsky, Bush Says Financial Crisis Needs Coordinated Response, 
REUTERS (Oct. 11, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-financial-g7-bush-
idUKTRE49A1W020081011 [https://perma.cc/8WN2-VUKX]. 
7 President George W. Bush, President Bush Discusses Financial Markets and 
World Economy (Nov. 13, 2008), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/news/releases/2008/11/20081113-4.html [https://perma.cc/5W8Y-
EFL9]. 
8 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, At the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago’s 42nd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition (May 18, 
2006), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060518a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/M6AA-7TMT], in BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. 
[FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS], Basel II: Its Promise and Its Challenges. 
9 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 27 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WVJ-9XUH]. 
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Tarullo, one of Obama’s campaign advisors10 and President Clin-
ton’s assistant for international economic policy,11 wrote that the 
“tortured negotiations” over Basel II had kept U.S. regulators from 
addressing the very risks that torpedoed Bear Stearns.12  Without 
discounting cooperation entirely, he wrote, “something different 
must be tried.”13 
Surprisingly, Obama’s victory that fall ushered in victories for 
both believers and skeptics of international regulatory coordination.  
After the crisis, as a member of the Basel Committee14 and Financial 
Action Task Force,15 the United States engaged actively in the crea-
tion of new international standards16 for bank capital,17 liquidity,18 
                                               
10 Joanna Klonsky, Foreign Policy Brain Trusts: Obama’s Advisers, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 11, 2008), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/foreign-policy-
brain-trusts-obamas-advisers [https://perma.cc/5G24-MZUR]. 
11 Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Daniel K. Tarullo, [hereinafter Tarullo Biog-
raphy] https://www.federalreservehistory.org/people/daniel_k_tarullo 
[https://perma.cc/5GL9-2XSL] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
12 DANIEL TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 9 (2008). 
13 Id. at 284. 
14 Bank for Int’l Settlements [BIS], Basel Committee Membership, (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm [https://perma.cc/W2WQ-BMUY]. 
15 Financial Action Task Force [FATF], FATF Members and Observers: The 37 
Members of FATF [hereinafter FATF, Members and Observers], http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/about/membersandobservers [https://perma.cc/H8CS-2Z2A] (last vis-
ited Feb. 7, 2018). 
16 See, e.g., BIS, Basel III: International Regulatory Framework for Banks, 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm [https://perma.cc/W4GY-WFX4] (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2018) (providing overview of the Basel III framework). 
17 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III DEFINITION OF 
CAPITAL - FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (BIS 2011), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs198.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GHN-X26U]. 
18 See, e.g., BIS, Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitor-
ing Tools, https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.htm [https://perma.cc/4N5D-
Z3S7], (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (“The LCR was first published in December 2010.  
At that time, the Basel Committee put in place a rigorous process to review the 
standard and its implications for financial markets, credit extension and economic 
growth.”). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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risk management,19 governance,20 and the prevention of money 
laundering and the financing of terrorism.21  However, federal poli-
cymakers also began to express new skepticism towards the work of 
foreign financial regulators.  Beginning with the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”),22 they 
ratified policies that exposed the U.S. affiliates of foreign banks to 
stricter treatment on American shores.  These trends were not re-
stricted to certain branches of government, nor to certain areas of 
financial regulation, but coexisted across U.S. policy, even within 
the same piece of legislation. 
This Comment attempts to explain how America could, ostensi-
bly, both jealously guard and willingly cede control over the rules 
that governed its financial system.  America’s renewed commitment 
to international engagement was consistent with rational institu-
tionalism, particularly with Robert Keohane’s “demand–side” ac-
count of international regimes.23  Keohane argued that the “anar-
chy” and “pervasive uncertainty” of a world without global 
government create transaction costs, which prevent nations from en-
gaging in coordinated, “mutually beneficial” behavior.24  Interna-
tional institutions lower those transaction costs—for example, by 
creating legal commitments (and with them, liability) or easing the 
acquisition of information; institutions allow nations to make 
                                               
19 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: 
STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR (BIS 2009), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf [https://perma.cc/39VR-7NLG].  The 
BIS published numerous documents on risk management, including capital plan-
ning, market risk, counterparty credit risk, and compensation.  See generally BIS, 
Basel Committee - Risk Management, https://www.bis.org/list/bcbs/tid_50/in-
dex.htm [https://perma.cc/WYG3-D6T7] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018). 
20 See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, COMPENSATION PRINCIPLES 
AND STANDARDS ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY (BIS 2010), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs166.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7PL-BQWL]. 
21 See FATF, International Standards on Combatting Money Laundering and the Fi-
nancing of Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (Feb. 2012) [herein-
after FATF, International Standards], http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/docu-
ments/recommendations/pdfs/fatf_recommendations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3HK-LHL6]. 
22 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, Pub. 
L. No. 111–203, § 929–Z, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 53o). 
23 See Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT’L ORG. 
325 (1982). 
24 Id. at 332. 
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agreements that would otherwise be “impossible to consummate.”25  
Many of the institutions Obama mentioned in his Cooper Union 
speech were designed with such a purpose in mind—for example, 
the Basel Committee, formed in response to United States and EU 
spillovers from the failure of Herstatt Bank in Cologne, and the Fi-
nancial Stability Forum, formed in the wake of the 1998 turbulence 
in Asian capital markets.26  The 2008 crisis revealed more and greater 
external transaction costs, which had kept countries from cooperat-
ing effectively to oversee their financial institutions.  Under this 
view, recommitting to Basel was a way to internalize and reduce 
these costs. 
However, the demand-side account provides a less satisfying ex-
planation of America’s post-crisis domestic financial regulations.  
Though they generally create no binding international legal obliga-
tions, regulatory fora like the Basel Committee are premised on mu-
tual trust; participating countries agree to implement policy on the 
condition that their peers do so as well.27  However, Dodd-Frank’s 
heightened prudential standards,28 restrictions on IMF support,29 
and novel supervisory authority over foreign nonbanks30 were not 
contingent measures; they applied even if a foreign country’s bank 
supervisor lived up to international norms.  In short, the United 
States was not simply a unified rational actor “hedging its bets” on 
the international stage using domestic policy; the country’s actions 
seemed to both preclude and assume the possibility its allies would 
defect and “under-regulate” their financial institutions. 
To explain this concurrence of cooperation and defection, one 
must instead look to domestic politics—not just electoral, but also 
institutional and individual.  Public attention to the details of regu-
latory reform was scant, especially as Congress considered other 
                                               
25 Id. at 334. 
26 See CHRISTOPHER BRUMMER, MINILATERALISM: HOW TRADE ALLIANCES, SOFT 
LAW AND FINANCIAL ENGINEERING ARE REDEFINING ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 99, 102 
(2014). 
27 See BIS, Basel Committee Charter, (Dec. 30, 2016), 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm [https://perma.cc/8NPM-5JKX] (“The 
BCBS [‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’] sets standards for the prudential 
regulation and supervision of banks.  The BCBS expects full implementation of its 
standards by BCBS members and their internationally active banks.”). 
28 12 U.S.C. § 5365 (2012). 
29 22 U.S.C. § 286tt (2012). 
30 12 U.S.C. § 5322 (2012). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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pieces of contentious legislation.  In this environment, the divergent 
preferences of actors in different parts of government—some favor-
ing more international cooperation, others opposing it—became 
more important to both domestic legal outcomes and U.S. conduct 
abroad.  American regulation of foreign financial institutions serves 
as a case study in how municipal dynamics can shape international 
relations, one that may shed light on other countries during the 2008 
financial crisis and on the United States during previous ones.31  In 
financial regulatory matters, it seems, politics rarely stops at the wa-
ter’s edge.32 
This Comment briefly reviews relevant U.S. banking law from 
before, during, and after the 2008 financial crisis, focusing on the 
provisions that govern foreign financial companies operating within 
the United States.  This law is less important than the story of the 
institutions that shaped it, and the Author has structured this Com-
ment accordingly.  The research was also inevitably influenced by 
what followed Dodd-Frank’s passage:  the adoption of a 2014 Fed-
eral Reserve rule requiring foreign banking organizations to reor-
ganize their domestic operations under intermediate holding com-
panies.33  Although Dodd-Frank did not require such a rule and 
                                               
31 For example, in 2014, the new Prudential Regulation Authority said that it 
would require institution-specific agreements with home supervisors for every for-
eign–bank branch in the U.K., or would otherwise require those branches to become 
subsidiaries, subject to their own capital and liquidity requirements.  See, e.g., Kai 
Kohlberger & John Andrews, Foreign Bank Branches in the U.K.: The PRA Approach, 
DELOITTE: FINANCIAL SERVICES U.K. (Feb. 26, 2014), http://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/fi-
nancialservices/2014/02/foreign-bank-branches-in-the-uk-the-pra-approach.html 
[https://perma.cc/PT9J-U2UQ].  It is also notable that the Basel I accord was 
agreed at roughly the same time as the passage of the International Banking Act of 
1978 in the United States.  See Bush, infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
32 Christopher Brummer explored the idea of territoriality as an instrument of 
extraterritorial regulation in a 2011 article, noting—without reference to Dodd–
Frank—that territorial jurisdiction remained a potent tool in regulating capital mar-
kets.  See Christopher Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique: Notes from 
the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499 (2011), https://scholar-
ship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=uclr 
[https://perma.cc/Q69U-P34B] (building on his core observations by adding both 
empirical information on post-crisis U.S. policy and by contextualizing this regula-
tory dynamic in international relations theory). 
33 See Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Federal Reserve Board Approves Final Rule 
Strengthening Supervision and Regulation of Large U.S. Bank Holding Companies and 
Foreign Banking Organizations, (Feb. 18, 2014), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140218a.htm [https://perma.cc/2TXA-
AY3W]. 
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although Congress urged the Federal Reserve to give “due regard to 
the principle of national treatment and equality of competitive op-
portunity” in foreign–bank rulemakings34—some have argued that 
the rule imposes a subsidiarization requirement on foreign–owned 
U.S. banks.35  The Author take no position on this interpretation, and 
it falls outside the time period and thus the scope of this Comment; 
however, the possibility of it emerged much earlier, and its spirit 
animated the final text of the bill. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND:  U.S. DOMESTIC REGULATION OF FOREIGN 
BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 
 
To operate in the United States, commercial banking organiza-
tions must meet two broad requirements, regardless of the national-
ity of their ultimate parent:  First, they must secure and maintain a 
charter; second, they must abide by the laws and regulations to 
which their charter subjects them.36  Over time, these requirements 
have shaped both commercial opportunities for foreign financial in-
stitutions in the United States and foreign access to the U.S. financial 
system.37  
Under the U.S. “dual banking system,” banks may opt to apply 
for either a state or federal charter.38 Federally chartered banking 
                                               
34 Enhanced Prudential Standards and Early Remediation Requirements for 
Foreign Banking Organizations and Foreign Nonbank Financial Companies, 77 
Fed. Reg. 76,628 (Dec. 28, 2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-12-28/pdf/2012-30734.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y7MS-PYCE]. 
35 See, e.g., Derek M. Bush, A Dramatic Departure? National Treatment of Foreign 
Banks, THE CLEARING HOUSE (2015), https://www.theclearinghouse.org/banking-
perspectives/2015/2015-q1-banking-perspectives/articles/national-treatment-of-
foreign-banks [https://perma.cc/S3ET-JZ2M]. 
36 See, e.g., Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, FAQ: How Can I Start a Bank?, (Aug. 
2, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X59T-M4PC]. 
37 See BRUMMER, supra note 26. 
38 See, e.g., Esther L. George, President & CEO of the Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 22, 2012), 
https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/speeches/2012-george-ga-csbs-05-
22.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LEB-2CW8], in Perspectives on 150 Years of Dual Banking; 
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking System, 41 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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organizations are subject to regulations by at least one federal pru-
dential regulator.  “National banks,” for example, are regulated by 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)39; “bank 
holding companies,” “financial holding companies,” and Edge Act 
corporations are regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve (“Federal Reserve”) and examined by regional banks of the 
Federal Reserve System.40 
Federally chartered banking organizations must also obtain fed-
eral deposit insurance and follow the regulations of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”).41  By contrast, state-chartered 
banking organizations are regulated by state banking authorities.  
However, most states require their banks to obtain federal deposit 
insurance,42 and state-chartered banks may join the Federal Reserve 
System.43  As a result, many state-chartered banks are also subject to 
FDIC and Federal Reserve oversight.44  
                                               
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 263 (1996), http://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1262&context=scholar [https://perma.cc/2ZZX-MWTA]. 
39 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency [OCC], U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
National Banks and Federal Savings Associations Lists, (Nov. 30, 2016), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/licensing/national-banks-fed-savings-assoc-
lists/index-active-bank-lists.html [https://perma.cc/LKU6-GD7F]. 
40 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANY ELECTION 
(2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/afi/fhcfilings.htm 
[https://perma.cc/9SSU-UEAQ]; FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL § 1030–40 (2016), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/publications/files/1000.pdf [https://perma.cc/BM98-CM7J]; Fed. Re-
serve Bd. of Governors, FAQ: How is the Federal Reserve System Structured?, (Aug. 17, 
2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12593.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5QES-5BTS].  
41 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. [FDIC], 2015-2019 Strategic Plan, (May 19, 2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/bankingindustry.html 
[https://perma.cc/2RU2-QMX6], superseded by FDIC, 2018-2022 Strategic Plan, 
(Jan. 1, 2018).  
42 John C. Dugan et al., FDIC Insurance and Regulation of U.S. Branches of Foreign 
Banks, in REGULATION OF FOREIGN BANKS AND AFFILIATES IN THE UNITED STATES 606 
n.2 (Randall D. Guynn ed., 8th ed. 2014).  
43 See, e.g., Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Membership, 
https://www.richmondfed.org/banking/federal_reserve_membership 
[https://perma.cc/FUU6-C2QE] (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).  
44 This description omits federal regulation by “functional regulatory agen-
cies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Ex-
change Commission, and since 2010, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
900 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
Foreign banks have long operated in the United States through 
a mix of distinct entity forms, each of which faces different limita-
tions on its funding and operations.45  Branch offices of U.S. banks 
can accept deposits and make loans on behalf of a foreign bank; 
branches do not need to raise separate capital from their parent bank 
by issuing equity or debt or meet separate capital requirements, 
such as holding a certain proportion of equity to other instruments.46  
By contrast, foreign bank subsidiaries must be separately capital-
ized.47  Bankers sometimes argue that such capital requirements are 
“expensive,” while regulators sometimes argue that the require-
ments improve investor oversight and make institutions more resil-
ient, reducing the expected costs.48  
Until 1978, foreign banking organizations and U.S. banks owned 
by a foreign financial institution were ineligible for federal charters 
or federal deposit insurance.  A foreign bank that wished to operate 
in the United States had to obtain a state charter, and states regu-
lated much of their activity.49  However, in the wake of the 1974 fail-
ures of Herstatt and Franklin National Bank, Congress passed the 
International Banking Act (“IBA”), which subjected foreign bank 
branches to the same Federal Reserve regulations and supervision 
as U.S. bank holding companies.50  
Under the “source of strength” doctrine, which the Federal Re-
serve successfully applied under the Bank Holding Company Act, 
foreign banks were effectively required to support—with both fi-
nancial and managerial resources—the operations of their U.S. 
branches.51  The IBA also established the principle of “national 
                                               
45 JAMES V. HAUPT, DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, 
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF U.S. BANKS AND IN U.S. BANKING MARKETS, FED. RES. 
BULL. 599–601 (1999), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulle-
tin/1999/0999lead.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HF9-UVMX]. 
46 Id.  A foreign bank may also open a “representative office” that can direct 
business towards its foreign parent but may not take deposits or make loans. 
47 Id. 
48 William Alden, What Is Bank Capital, Anyway?, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/10/what-is-bank-capital-anyway/ 
[https://perma.cc/2B9M-3HL4]. 
49 Dugan et al., supra note 42, at 606. 
50 See Bush, supra note 35. 
51 For a history of the doctrine, see Craig L. Brown, Board of Governors v. 
MCorp Financial, Inc.: Evaluating the Source-of-Strength Doctrine, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
235, 236 (1992), http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=1852&context=hlr [https://perma.cc/J4TP-AH2V]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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treatment and equality of competitive opportunity,” allowing for-
eign banks to obtain national charters from the OCC and deposit in-
surance from the FDIC.52 
Foreign banks faced more stringent federal regulations after a 
wave of late-1980s financial panics, including a scandal involving 
the Bank of Commerce Credit International (“BCCI”) and Banca Na-
zionale de Lavoro.53  Passed in 1991, the Foreign Bank Supervision 
Enhancement Act (“FBSEA”) required the Federal Reserve to ap-
prove any new foreign bank branches and decide whether a foreign 
bank’s home country subjected its parent to “comprehensive consol-
idated supervision.”54  For the first time, federal regulators had to 
assess the conduct of regulatory agencies in foreign countries, before 
letting a company from that foreign country operate in the United 
States.  Federal regulators have entered into “information-sharing 
memoranda of understanding” with foreign regulatory agencies, in-
cluding those in Dubai55 and the U.K.,56 to help satisfy this require-
ment.57 
                                               
52 See Frank Anthony Misuraca, Foreign Banking in the United States: An Objec-
tive Study of the International Banking Act of 1978, 4 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 539, 542–43 
(1995). 
53 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, World-Class Fraud: How B.C.C.I. Pulled It Off – A Special 
Report; At the End of a Twisted Trail, Piggy Bank for a Favored Few, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/12/business/world-class-fraud-
bcci-pulled-it-off-special-report-end-twisted-trail-piggy-bank.html 
[https://perma.cc/6HBA-9SWB]; 137 CONG. REC. 25,2662 (1991) (statement of Rep. 
Riggs on financial reform and “the BCCI affair”). 
54 FED RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, SR 08-9/CA 08-12, CONSOLIDATED 
SUPERVISION OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES AND THE COMBINED U.S. OPERATIONS OF 
FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS: ATTACHMENT C – DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 
(2008), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/sr0809c.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5D6-9Q39]. 
55 DFSA Enters into MOU with United States Banking Supervisors, MIDDLE EAST 
NEWS SERV. (Oct. 24, 2007), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/e107b545-
f631-422b-a528-8860dacd42c7/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/8KHW-
L3SM]. 
56 Angela Hayes & Charles Horn, FDIC and FSA Sign Agreement to Increase Co-
operative Cross-Border Framework for Emergency Planning and Action, MONDAQ BUS. 
BRIEFING (July 10, 2008), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/dce64a03-
802f-4ec0-b06f-4446f3f961e2/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/2ZGH-6EC6]. 
57 See The Future of Bank Examination and Supervision: Hearing Before the House 
Committee on Banking And Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions & 
Consumer Credit, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Andrew C. Hove, Jr., Acting 
Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), https://ad-
vance.lexis.com/api/permalink/eefc1ef9-de08-42fe-ba67-
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The FBSEA also required the Treasury Department to study 
the idea of only allowing foreign banks to operate in the United 
States through subsidiaries (holding their own capital) instead of 
branches (without holding their own capital).  However, Treasury 
rejected this idea, worrying that “foreign countries might also retal-
iate against U.S. bank branches, perhaps by requiring that they es-
tablish a subsidiary or by otherwise restricting their activities.”58 
Instead, over this same thirty year period, the United States 
participated in the creation of standards for banking oversight 
through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“Basel Com-
mittee”), a convening of G10 central bankers and bank regulators 
that began in 1974.59  The Committee began by issuing a non-binding 
accord on the definition and appropriate levels of bank capital, then 
crafted increasingly complex standards on cross-border regulation, 
the use of private banking risk models, and risk management.60  The 
second iteration of the Basel Framework (Basel II) was released in 
2006.61 
 
3.  THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS:  TRANSACTION COSTS AND COSTLY 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
The United States was in the process of implementing the 
risk-measurement provisions of Basel II when disruption in the 
mortgage market sparked the 2008 financial crisis.62  The crisis 
                                               
f6a3b5c6ceeb/?context=1000516 [https://perma.cc/RZM5-63S2] (“The FDIC has 
pursued, both bilaterally and with the other federal banking agencies, information-
sharing agreements with foreign supervisors.”).  
58 Treasury-Fed Study Backs U.S. Branches of Foreign Banks, BANKING POL'Y REP. 
8 (1993). 
59 BIS, History of the Basel Committee, (Apr. 14, 2018), 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PUP-UNTX]. 
60 Id. 
61 See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 
COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (2006), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8HEL-583Y]. 
62 See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Standards: Advanced Capital Adequacy Frame-
work—Basel II, 72 Fed. Reg. 69288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3) 
[https://perma.cc/G5E9-PSDS]. 
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revealed two substantial problems that were specific to foreign 
banks operating in the United States, which Basel II did not address. 
The first problem involved Lehman Brothers and demon-
strated the risk of relying on capital held overseas for the stability of 
U.S. banking operations.  The 158-year-old investment bank teetered 
on the brink of collapse in September 2008, when Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson, New York Federal Reserve President Timothy 
Geithner, and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Chair-
man Christopher Cox brokered a tentative acquisition by the U.K.-
based bank Barclays plc.63  However, with commitments from both 
Lehman and Barclays in place, Barclays’ regulator, the U.K. Finan-
cial Services Agency (FSA), refused to approve the deal without no-
tice to Barclays’ shareholders or greater assurances about Lehman’s 
solvency.64  Shareholder notice alone would require a long enough 
delay to virtually guarantee Lehman’s collapse.  After a call with 
U.K. FSA Chairman Callum McCarthy, Treasury Secretary Paulson 
ruefully told a room full of CEOs of large banks who had agreed to 
support the deal, “[the British] grin-f***ed us.” One CEO retorted: 
“Isn’t this our closest ally in the world?”65 
The second problem was the byproduct of a successful U.S. 
strategy to stanch financial panic.  One of the largest risks to the U.S. 
financial system came from American International Group (“AIG”), 
a multi-line insurance company that underwrote credit-default 
swaps (“CDS”), which guaranteed large private financial institu-
tions against losses on mortgage-backed securities.66  As those losses 
began to mount, AIG itself began to falter, and the possibility of its 
failure to pay amounts due on those swaps imperiled the solvency 
of major U.S. financial institutions.67  To avoid catastrophe, the U.S. 
government offered AIG an $85 billion loan facility in exchange for 
                                               
63 James B. Stewart, Eight Days, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/21/eight-days 
[https://perma.cc/X6DQ-G9YX] (discussing the role of various political players in 
the financial crisis). 
64 ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 
343–45 (2010). 
65 Id. at 350. 
66 Adam Davidson, How Lehman Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-how-aig-fell-apart-
idUSMAR85972720080918 [https://perma.cc/Q26V-QZLY]. 
67 Id. 
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a controlling stake in the company.68  However, AIG’s exposures 
were global, not just domestic, meaning that support from U.S. tax-
payers helped AIG honor its obligations to foreign financial institu-
tions.69 
Supporting AIG—and its overseas counterparties—came at 
a steep political cost.  Federal Reserve skeptics claimed that the gov-
ernment had used trillions in taxpayer funds to support foreigners,70 
a claim that appeared more egregious when AIG and other recipi-
ents of federal support paid out hundreds of millions of dollars in 
bonuses.71  Worse still, press outlets often reported the Federal Re-
serve’s gross extensions as if they were net figures, making the sup-
port offered by U.S. taxpayers seem even larger.72  To critics, foreign 
banks had not been a source of strength to the United States; rather, 
the United States had been a source of strength to foreign banks. 
 
 
                                               
68 Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Cen-
tral Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 16, 2008), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122156561931242905 [https://perma.cc/42TC-
4YBE]. 
69 Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Banks it Paid with U.S. Bailout Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/business/16res-
cue.html [https://perma.cc/FE3P-SKU7]. 
70 See, e.g., Associated Press, Fed Reveals which Banks, Companies got Trillions in 
Emergency Bailout, Including McDonald's, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/fed-reveals-banks-companies-tril-
lions-emergency-bailout-including-mcdonald-article-1.473798 
[https://perma.cc/ZYN6-27W7]; Tracey Greenstein, The Fed’s $16 Trillion Bailouts 
Under–Reported, FORBES (Sep. 20, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/traceygreenstein/2011/09/20/the-feds-16-trillion-
bailouts-under-reported [https://perma.cc/5Z9C-B3WP]; Sewell Chan, From Tea 
Party Advocates, Anger at the Federal Reserve, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/11/us/politics/11fed.html 
[https://perma.cc/EAR6-23QL]. 
71 Eamon Javers, AIG Ships Billions in Bailout Abroad, POLITICO (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2009/03/aig-ships-billions-in-bailout-abroad-
020039 [https://perma.cc/V248-XH4Z]. 
72 See, e.g., Jon Greenberg, Did the Fed Create $15 Trillion During the Bailout and 
Send $5 Trillion Overseas?, POLITIFACT (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.politi-
fact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2011/dec/09/ron-paul/did-fed-create-15-
trillion-during-bailout-and-send [https://perma.cc/Q84C-BXTE]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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4.  UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
 POST–CRISIS FINANCIAL REGULATORY MEASURES 
 
Despite this early backlash, much of the initial United States re-
sponse to the financial crisis was multilateral and international.  By 
August 2009, the Federal Reserve had extended temporary bilateral 
credit lines to fourteen other central banks, in order to maintain li-
quidity in foreign currency markets.73  In September 2009, a meeting 
of G20 leaders produced a list of specific commitments each country 
would make to advance financial reform.74  To enforce these com-
mitments, the G20 converted the Financial Stability Forum into the 
Financial Stability Board (“FSB”), a clearinghouse to oversee the 
largest global financial institutions and exchange information on 
system-wide financial risks.75  The FSB began to monitor compliance 
with Basel Committee standards, and starting in 2010, the Basel 
Committee itself began to publish revised standards for bank over-
sight.76  The United States also redoubled its commitment to the Fi-
nancial Action Task Force (“FATF”), a group of thirty-five states and 
international organizations established in 1989 to coordinate anti-
money laundering and counter-the-financing-of-terrorism 
(AML/CFT) policy.77  FATF issued a more stringent set of non-bind-
ing “recommendations” in 2012 and facilitated a set of peer reviews 
                                               
73 FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, CREDIT AND LIQUIDITY PROGRAMS AND THE 
BALANCE SHEET: CENTRAL BANK LIQUIDITY SWAPS, (2017), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_liquidityswaps.htm [https://perma.cc/2C5T-
XBHQ]. 
74 OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G-20: FACT SHEET 
ON U.S. FINANCIAL REFORM AND THE G-20 LEADERS’ AGENDA (2011), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/04/g-20-fact-
sheet-us-financial-reform-and-g-20-leaders-agenda [https://perma.cc/8NYT-
YPP4]. 
75 Elena Moya, Financial Stability Board: How It Will Work, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
3, 2009), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/04/financial-stability-
board-g20 [https://perma.cc/9Y76-A6QA]. 
76 HUBERTO M. ENNIS & DAVID A. PRICE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND, 
EB11-06, BASEL III AND THE CONTINUING EVOLUTION OF BANK CAPITAL REGULATION 
(2011), https://www.richmondfed.org/~/media/richmondfedorg/publica-
tions/research/economic_brief/2011/pdf/eb_11-06.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6NB-KLRV]; Financial Stability Board [FSB], Basel III – Imple-
mentation, http://www.fsb.org/basel-iii [https://perma.cc/P7AK-3DE8] (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2018). 
77 FATF, Members and Observers, supra note 15. 
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between its members’ finance ministries.78  Finally, even in its own 
domestic activities, the United States showed deference to foreign 
regulators—for example, limiting its initial stress-testing program to 
U.S. companies, even though two of the ten largest financial institu-
tions in the United States were owned by foreign banks.79 
These initial international steps had several traits in common.  
First, as with previous Basel capital accords, they gained the whole-
hearted support of the G20, but they remained formally nonbinding.  
Second, enforcement mechanisms were limited to reputational 
costs; the FSB and FATF would “name and shame” countries that 
failed to honor their commitments, but they could impose no other 
formal sanctions.   
Third, senior officials in the executive branch retained almost 
complete discretion over U.S. consent to these measures.  The Un-
dersecretary of the Treasury for International Finance held respon-
sibility for representing the United States in G7 and G20 discussions 
under many of its recent officeholders, including John Taylor,80 Tim-
othy Adams,81 David Mulford,82 and, under President Obama, Lael 
                                               
78 FATF, International Standards, supra note 21. 
79 See FED. RESERVE BD. OF GOVERNORS, THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS (2009), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090507a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3AX7-V7R2].  The two foreign institutions in question, based on 
1Q09 FDIC call report data, were HSBC North America Holdings and Barclays 
Group U.S. 
80 See Stanford Ctr. on Global Poverty on Dev., John B. Taylor, STANFORD UNIV., 
https://globalpoverty.stanford.edu/people/john-b-taylor 
[https://perma.cc/7RWQ-WGZ8] (last visited Jan. 26, 2018) (“Taylor served as Un-
der Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs where he was responsible for... 
coordinating financial policy with the G-7 countries”). 
81 See Inst. of Int’l Fin. [IFF], IFF Leadership: Timothy D. Adams, President and 
CEO, https://www.iif.com/leadership [https://perma.cc/26QP-BWLW] (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2018) (“Previously, [Adams] served as Under Secretary of Treasury for 
International Affairs... [and] was the Administration’s point person on interna-
tional financial issues, including exchange rate policy, G-7 meetings, and IMF and 
World Bank issues.”). 
82 See Credit Suisse Appoints Ambassador David Mulford Vice-Chairman Interna-
tional, BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 11, 2009), https://www.business-
wire.com/news/home/20090311006307/en/Credit-Suisse-Appoints-Ambassa-
dor-David-Mulford-Vice-Chairman [https://perma.cc/5B4E-KFER] 
(“Ambassador Mulford also previously served in the [U.S.] Government as Under 
Secretary and Assistant Secretary of the [U.S.] Treasury for International Affairs. . . 
. [where] he played a key role representing the [U.S.] Government on a number of 
issues, including coordinating economic policy with the G-7.”). 
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Brainard.83  Treasury’s Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial 
Crimes has long represented the United States to FATF.84  The Fed-
eral Reserve, OCC, and FDIC have long represented the United 
States in Basel and FSB activities.85  Beyond overseeing and confirm-
ing the leaders of these agencies—and, in the case of the U.S. Treas-
ury, appropriating its operating funds—the roles of Congress and 
the courts remained relatively limited.86 
Leaders of the U.S. executive branch were not shy about their 
support for increased international cooperation.  In closing the G20 
Pittsburgh Summit, President Obama said that since “the nations of 
the world share mutual interests,” the G20 countries must inaugu-
rate “a new era of engagement . . . and act on behalf of our shared 
security and prosperity.”87  Bernanke, who remained Federal Re-
serve Chairman under Obama, agreed with this sentiment publicly, 
calling it “self-evident that, in light of the global nature of financial 
institutions and markets, the reform of financial regulation and su-
pervision should be coordinated internationally to the greatest ex-
tent possible.”88  Geithner did the same, telling an IMF audience that 
                                               
83 See Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors, Board Members: Lael Brainard (Oct. 19, 
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/bios/board/brainard.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5B78-JG3C] (“Dr. Brainard served as Undersecretary of the U.S. 
Department of Treasury from 2010 to 2013 and Counselor to the Secretary of the 
Treasury in 2009.  During this time, she was the U.S. Representative to the G-20 
Finance Deputies and G-7 Deputies and was a member of the Financial Stability 
Board.”). 
84 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Delegation Participates in Financial Action 
Task Force Plenary (June 21, 2013), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl1989.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q6RM-D65F]; Sabina Kook, U.S. 
Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Notes: Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Evolving in 
its Effort to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Mar. 27, 2013), 
https://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Financial-Action-Task-Force-
(FATF)-Evolving-in-its-Effort-to-Combat-Money-Laundering-and-Terrorist-
Financing.aspx [https://perma.cc/8TCW-D3TF]. 
85 BIS, Basel Committee Membership, supra note 14. 
86 See, e.g., Brooksley Born & William Donaldson, Make Regulators Self-Funding, 
POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/03/self-funding-
of-regulators-would-help-fiscal-mess-088666 [https://perma.cc/9E96-9JPU]. 
87 President Barack Obama, The President Addresses the Press on G-20 Sum-
mit (Sept. 25, 2009), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/realitycheck/video/The-President-
Addresses-the-Press-on-G-20-Summit?tid=101#transcript 
[https://perma.cc/E8HS-CQ3F]. 
88 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Forum, Jackson Hole, Wyoming: 
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its response to the crisis must be “quick, forceful, and global in na-
ture.”89 
In their respective memoirs, Geithner and Bernanke also sup-
ported internationalism—in order to preserve U.S. competitiveness.  
“Without international coordination,” Bernanke wrote: 
 
tougher domestic regulation might result only in banking ac-
tivity moving out of the United States to foreign financial 
centers.  Moreover, even if foreign jurisdictions adopted 
comparably tough rules, in the absence of international co-
ordination those rules might be inconsistent with U.S. stand-
ards, which could fragment global capital markets and oth-
erwise diminish the effectiveness of new rules.90 
 
Geithner struck a similar note in 2014: “If we had unilaterally 
imposed strict new limits on risk, without encouraging higher 
standards globally, we simply would have reduced the market share 
of U.S. firms around the world, without making the global system 
more resilient.”91 
The close alignment of these two perspectives—one at the helm 
of the Federal Reserve, the other at the Treasury—was not lost on 
                                               
Reflections on a Year of Crisis (Aug. 21, 2009), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090821a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ML9P-ARNA]; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Fed. 
Reserve, Speech at the Stamp Lecture, London School of Economics, London, Eng-
land: The Crisis and the Policy Response, (Jan. 13, 2009), https://www.federalre-
serve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090113a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3XUR-Q6MH] (“Finally, a clear lesson of the recent period is 
that the world is too interconnected for nations to go it alone in their economic, 
financial, and regulatory policies.  International cooperation is thus essential if we 
are to address the crisis successfully and provide the basis for a healthy, sustained 
recovery.”). 
89 Timothy Geithner, U.S. Sec. of the Treasury, Statement at International 
Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) Meeting (Apr. 25, 2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg104.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7VKP-9C8N]. 
90 BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 454 (2015). 
91 TIMOTHY GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 400 
(2014). 
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Members of Congress at the time.92  There was, however, a notable 
skeptic in the executive branch, who was heavily involved in U.S. 
activities at Basel and the FSB:  Daniel Tarullo, then at the Federal 
Reserve, who quickly emerged as the institution’s de facto leader on 
financial regulation.93   
Tarullo’s public statements at the time were circumspect, saying 
that “satisfyingly clean and comprehensive solutions” to interna-
tional financial regulation were “not within sight.”94  Some, how-
ever, were more pointed, as when he used apophasis to reference 
the U.K.’s actions on Lehman Brothers: “Some have called into ques-
tion the traditional assumption that home country authorities will 
be willing and able to support all of the worldwide operations of a 
banking group headquartered in its jurisdiction.”95  Tarullo’s aca-
demic writings were still more direct.  In his 2008 book, Banking on 
Basel, Tarullo argued that “none of [the] potential advantages” of the 
Basel Committee’s recent work were “both substantial and likely to 
be realized”; instead, Basel should focus on improving domestic au-
thorities’ oversight of their own banks.96  As a potent voice in the 
                                               
92 In a later hearing, Congressman Michael Capuano of Massachusetts asked 
Bernanke a question about a Treasury initiative, saying that while “in some ways 
my questions should be addressed to Secretary Geithner. . . . [Y]ou have chosen to 
now get married, and once you are married, you do have to answer for your 
spouse.”  Bernanke responded, “We are not married.  We are just good friends.”  
An Examination of the Extraordinary Efforts by the Federal Reserve Bank to Provide Li-
quidity in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the House Committee on Financial 
Services, 111th Cong. 35 (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg48674/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg48674.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZD2-MVK2]. 
93 Ryan Tracy & Emily Glazer, The Most Powerful Man in Banking, WALL ST. J. 
(May 31, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/daniel-tarullo-the-one-man-judge-
and-jury-for-banks-1464720855 [https://perma.cc/XSK8-QKYD]. 
94 Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor U.S. Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Institute of 
International Bankers Conference on Cross-Border Insolvency Issues, New York, 
New York: Supervising and Resolving Large Financial Institutions (Nov. 10, 2009), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20091110a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5J4K-QRF2]. 
95 Id. 
96 TARULLO, supra note 12, at 10–11; see also Tarullo Biography, supra note 11, at 
190 (“There is an undeniable attraction to a conceptually elegant mode of regulation 
that calibrates bank capital precisely to the risks associated with whatever credit 
exposures a bank may assume, whatever instruments it may trade, and whatever 
operations it may conduct.  This attraction has perhaps come dangerously close to 
being a Siren song for at least some Basel II authors and defenders.  One hopes that 
the subprime crisis has, if nothing else, injected sufficiently dissonant notes to catch 
the attention of Basel II believers”). 
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Federal Reserve and at Basel, Tarullo was well-positioned to turn his 
skepticism into U.S. policy. 
 
5.  COOPERATION MEETS DEFECTION:   
THE DRAFTING OF DODD-FRANK 
 
The initial Obama Administration proposals for financial reform 
legislation reflected this mix of views within the executive branch:  
They placed a high premium on international cooperation, and they 
limited the ability of more skeptical, structurally insulated bureau-
cratic actors, such as the Federal Reserve, to diminish that coopera-
tion. 
The White House’s first salvo in the reform debate was a 2009 
white paper, dividing the administration’s ideas for changing finan-
cial oversight into five separate objectives.97  The paper proposed 
that regulators give more attention to foreign financial firms, but 
only if those firms’ “U.S. operations pose[d] a threat to financial sta-
bility.”98  The Federal Reserve would determine which firms posed 
such a threat, but only “in consultation with Treasury” and with 
“due regard to the principle of national treatment and equality of 
competitive opportunity.”99  In short, the white paper charged the 
Federal Reserve with hunting for risk among foreign banks in the 
United States—but only under the Treasury’s supervision. 
The Administration’s first draft of financial reform legislation 
took a similar approach, giving the Federal Reserve authority to reg-
ulate the U.S. activities of foreign banks, but ensuring the Treasury 
would oversee the exercise of that authority.  Section 204 of the draft 
allowed the Federal Reserve to designate any foreign bank with 
“substantial assets or operations in the United States” as a “Foreign 
Tier 1 financial holding company.”100  The Federal Reserve could not 
delegate this authority, and Treasury’s only role in its application 
                                               
97 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM – A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 1–2, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GUT-6MS9]. 
98 Id. at 84 (emphasis added). 
99 Id. at 84–85. 
100 Administration Combined Draft Legislation for Financial Regulatory Re-
form, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 204(a)(1)((B)(vi), LAW LIBRARIANS’ SOC’Y WASH., D.C. 
(2009), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/dodd-frank-act_admn-reg-
reform-bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D7D-JG4A]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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was through the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which the 
Treasury Secretary would chair and which could “recommend” 
firms for oversight.101  However, a separate section mitigated the 
Federal Reserve’s ability to exercise this authority, requiring it and 
the Treasury to “consult with their foreign counterparties and 
through appropriate multilateral organizations to reach agreement 
to extend comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and 
regulation to all highly leveraged and substantially interconnected 
financial companies.”102  Here, the Federal Reserve gained some-
what greater leeway, but its constraints took the form of legislative 
obligations, not bureaucratic ones from the Treasury. 
However, Members of Congress—from both parties—met the 
international elements of the Administration’s proposals with sub-
stantially more skepticism.  Some, like Representative Ron Paul (R-
TX), railed against the Federal Reserve and its general lack of trans-
parency, demanding to know “what we are doing when we are talk-
ing to foreign central banks, foreign governments, international or-
ganizations.”103 
Others expressed concern that by relying on international coop-
eration, U.S. taxpayers would again have to subsidize the poor de-
cisions of foreign banks.  Representative Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY), 
citing AIG, said that “a significant amount, billions and billions, tens 
of billions of dollars, went to foreign banks. . . .  I do not believe we 
should be bailing out foreign banks.  I believe other governments 
should bail out their own banks.”104  Representative Spencer Bachus 
(R-AL) claimed that “foreign banks . . . were paid dollar-for-dollar 
[on AIG claims] within hours of the bailout, and U.S. banks have yet 
                                               
101 Id.  
102 Id. at § 204(k). 
103 Regulatory Restructuring: Balancing the Independence of the Federal Reserve in 
Monetary Policy with Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the House Committee on 
Financial Services Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy and Technology, 111th 
Cong. 4 (2009), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
111hhrg53234/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg53234.pdf [https://perma.cc/9L7H-3X6H] 
(statement of Rep. Paul, Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). 
104 Perspectives on Regulation of Systemic Risk in the Financial Services Industry: 
Hearing Before the House Committee on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 32–33 (2009), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48867/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg48867.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKP9-Z9HR] (statement of Rep. McCarthy, 
Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). 
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to receive any payment . . . .”105  Representative Brad Sherman (D-
CA) cited the “billions of taxpayer dollars transferred to foreign en-
tities” as an embrace of “cowboy capitalism.”106  Representative Jeb 
Hensarling (R-TX) said the Obama Administration had made AIG 
“a conduit for the transferring of taxpayer wealth to counterparties, 
some of which include foreign entities.”107  Members of the Senate 
made similar points, if less colorfully.108 
When confronted with Congressional skepticism, most Admin-
istration officials defended the need for international cooperation.  
Comptroller of the Currency John Dugan, argued that “the global 
nature of today’s financial institutions increasingly requires that su-
pervisory policies and actions be coordinated and implemented on 
a global basis.”109  SEC Chair Mary Schapiro told a Senator that 
“[o]ur experience has confirmed the need for cross-border coordina-
tion and dialogue, as well as for sound regulatory regimes for 
                                               
105 Addressing the Need for Comprehensive Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the 
House Committee on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 3 (2009), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48875/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg48875.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EUC-WZJ6] (statement of Rep. Bachus, 
Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). 
106 Perspectives on Systemic Risk: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, & Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 6 (2009), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48863/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg48863.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5Z5-HZDF] (statement of Rep. Sherman, 
Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services).  
107 Systemic Risk and Insurance: Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, & Government Sponsored Enterprises, 111th Cong. 8 (2009), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52400/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg52400.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7YK-A858] (statement of Rep. Hensarling, 
Member, H. Comm. on Financial Services). 
108 See, e.g., Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing on S. 
111-297 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Establishing a Framework Hearing], 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg55278/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg55278.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2K6-MCMW] (statement of Sen. Bunning, 
Member, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs) (asking each Obama Ad-
ministration witness the same question: “AIG is probably the best known example 
of how problems can cross borders.  How do we deal with the risk created in our 
country by actions somewhere else, as well as the impact of actions in the [United 
States] on foreign firms?”); see also Strengthening and Streamlining Prudential Bank 
Supervision: Hearing on S. 111-407 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) [hereinafter Strengthening and Streamlining Hear-
ing], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg56376/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg56376.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6GM-KAJV]. 
109 Strengthening and Streamlining Hearing, supra note 108, at 88. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol39/iss3/6
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principal subsidiaries of international holding companies.”110  
Geithner vigorously defended the need for a “level playing field that 
can be enforced more evenly, and so that risk can’t just migrate to 
where it is going to face less strict supervision and oversight.”111  
Others, however, were more aligned with Tarullo and Congres-
sional skeptics.  FDIC Chair Sheila Bair invoked the Foreign Bank 
Supervision Act in her testimony, to suggest that the United States 
require foreign banks to operate only in separately capitalized sub-
sidiaries.112 
Congress’s own reform legislation reflected the legislature’s hes-
itancy about the regulation of foreign banks, giving more authority 
to domestic regulators and placing less emphasis on international 
fora.  The initial bills drafted by Representative Barney Frank (D-
MA) and Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) merely left the detailed 
questions of foreign bank oversight almost entirely to the Federal 
Reserve.113  However, some proposed amendments were much 
harder on foreign banks—such as a pre-ratification draft of H.R. 
4173, which gave the SEC and Federal Reserve the power to deny or 
revoke the charter of a bank whose home country “has not adopted, 
or made demonstrable progress toward adopting, an appropriate 
system of financial regulation to mitigate such systemic risk.”114 
                                               
110 Establishing a Framework Hearing, supra note 108, at 123. 
111 The Administration’s Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before 
the House Committee on Financial Services, 111th Cong. 33 (2009), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg54867/pdf/CHRG-
111hhrg54867.pdf [https://perma.cc/43MR-XU7T].  
112 See Establishing a Framework Hearing, supra note 108, at 110–15.   
113 See Restoring Financial Stability Act of 2009 § 104 (Dodd Discussion Draft 
Nov. 10, 2009), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/bill-111th-s3217-
discussion-draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/22NN-6MS4] (creating a new unified fed-
eral financial regulatory agency under Sen. Dodd’s bill that would only apply 
heightened regulation to foreign banks with “due regard to the principle of national 
treatment and equality of competitive opportunity” and would try not to cause 
“sharp, discontinuous changes” with the new requirements); Financial Stability Im-
provement Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 104, LAW LIBRARIANS’ SOC’Y WASH., 
D.C. (2009), http://www.llsdc.org/assets/DoddFrankdocs/frank-treasury-dis-
cussion-draft_2009-10-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/V66D-8LX5] (showing Rep. 
Frank’s joint draft with Treasury provided still less guidance to the Federal Reserve 
on foreign-banking-related rulemaking). 
114 The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 1951(l) (2009) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
111hr4173ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr4173ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/76TD-AP3A].  
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The final text of Dodd-Frank split the difference between these 
views, simultaneously embracing stricter regulation onshore and 
greater cooperation overseas.  The stricter provisions were scattered 
throughout the Act;  section 165 directed the Federal Reserve to is-
sue more stringent requirements for non-bank financial compa-
nies—including bank holding companies, and thereby foreign bank-
ing organizations—which accounted for a bank’s home-country 
regulations and gave “due regard to the principle of national treat-
ment and equality of competitive opportunity.”115  The Federal Re-
serve also gained the ability—but not the requirement—to restrict 
the activities of any foreign bank threatening U.S. financial stabil-
ity.116  Section 156 required the U.S. Executive Director of the IMF to 
oppose any international loan “not likely to be able to [re]pay its ob-
ligations [in full].”117  Section 167, for the first time, codified the 
source-of-strength doctrine into law.118  
However, these tougher provisions, giving greater authority 
over foreign bank operations to domestic regulators, stood in stark 
contrast to more internationalist ones.  Section 275 directed the SEC 
and CFTC to “consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory au-
thorities” and authorized them to “agree to such information-shar-
ing arrangements as may be deemed to be necessary or appropriate 
in the public interest” around the regulation of swaps and deriva-
tives.119  Section 175 went further, by effectively codifying United 
States involvement in Basel, requiring the Federal Reserve and 
Treasury Secretary to “consult with their foreign counterparts and 
through appropriate multilateral organizations to [encourage] com-
prehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation to all 
highly leveraged and substantially interconnected financial compa-
nies.”120 
 
 
 
                                               
115 Id. at § 165.  
116 Id. at § 121; see also Id. at § 173–74.  
117 Id. at § 156. 
118 Id. at § 167; see also Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and 
Revisited – Part II, 129 BANKING L.J. 867 (2012) (analyzing the source-of-strength doc-
trine in relation to the Dodd-Frank and how it has changed in light of this new Act).  
119 The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 275 (2009). 
120 Id. at § 175. 
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6.  BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND LOW-PUBLIC-SALIENCY REFORM 
 
Despite the early backlash over “foreign bailouts,” it is unlikely 
that the split outcome was the result of popular political pressure.  
Financial reform legislation took shape in the middle of the con-
servative “tea party wave,” which reclaimed control of Congress in 
November 2010 and advocated total opposition to any measure that 
President Obama favored.121  Popular support for financial reform 
was divided along party lines, with Democrats favoring increased 
bank regulation by fifty-three points and Republicans opposing it 
by forty-eight.122  However, financial reform was neither the most 
salient nor the most polarizing issue that Congress was debating at 
the time.  A contentious climate change bill,123 a $3.5 trillion federal 
budget,124 and comprehensive national healthcare reform were also 
on the legislative agenda.125  Though polling on the issue saliency of 
                                               
121 Rebecca Ballhaus, A Short History of the Tea Party Movement, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 
27, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/02/27/a-short-history-of-the-
tea-party-movement/ [https://perma.cc/WPD9-TMP3]; see also Christopher S. 
Parker, Wither the Tea Party? The Future of a Political Movement, 66 BROOKINGS INST. 
ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUDIES 1 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/06/Parker_TeaParty.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GTG-X9RT] 
(providing the Tea Party’s history).  
122 Lydia Saad, Banking Reform Sells Better When ‘Wall Street’ is Mentioned, 
GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/127448/banking-reform-
sells-better-wall-street-mentioned.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z6UB-99ZJ] (demon-
strating that Democrats are more likely to support banking reform than Republi-
cans.).   
123 Daniel J. Weiss, Anatomy of a Senate Climate Bill Death, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (Oct. 12, 2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/is-
sues/green/news/2010/10/12/8569/anatomy-of-a-senate-climate-bill-death/ 
[https://perma.cc/SHS2-XRWH] (stating Republicans took a view of opposing 
Obama administration proposals that would increase his popularity); see also S. REP. 
NO. 1733 (2010), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-
bill/1733/related-bills [https://perma.cc/V2L7-GVWD].  
124 Carl Hulse, Budgets Approved, With No G.O.P. Votes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/us/politics/03budget.html 
[https://perma.cc/8S87-NN35] (discussing the importance of the budget for the 
Obama Administration).  
125 See Norm Ornstein, The Real Story of Obamacare’s Birth, THE ATLANTIC (July 
6, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/the-real-story-
of-obamacares-birth/397742/ [https://perma.cc/XQC8-DPU4] (noting healthcare 
was at the top of President Obama’s legislative agenda).  
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financial reform is almost nonexistent,126 it is plausible—even 
likely—that these other issues took priority for engaged constitu-
ents, especially as compared to minutiae of financial regulation like 
Basel participation and subsidiarization.127 
If everyday voters were focused elsewhere, one might conclude 
that domestic politics had little to do with Dodd-Frank’s divided 
stance on international cooperation.  That conclusion would be con-
sistent with the analysis Prof.  Beth Simmons offers of a different 
policy agenda in her book, Mobilizing for Human Rights.128  Human 
rights treaties are enforced, she argues, in part because they “influ-
ence the national policy agenda” and mobilize domestic actors 
around their cause.129  In the absence of other enforcement mecha-
nisms, popular domestic politics gives these accords potency.  By 
contrast, Basel, FATF, and their peer institutions seem like textbook 
cases of self-enforcing international agreements.  From a rational in-
stitutionalist perspective, parties not only have an incentive to mon-
itor and deter non-compliance (as the Lehman and AIG examples 
above show); they also have the ability to do so.130  
                                               
126 See, e.g., Frank Newport, Economy Dominates as Nation's Most Important 
Problem, GALLUP (July 14, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/141275/economy-
dominates-nation-important-problem.aspx [https://perma.cc/WCR8-UWEJ] 
(tracking polls from the time of Dodd-Frank’s passage, including questions about 
the “most important problems” facing Americans, but failing to provide a specific 
option for financial regulation and reform).  
127 See Stephen Mangan, JPMorgan CEO Says Bank Rules ‘Anti-American,’ 
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-banks-basel-jpmor-
gan-idUSTRE78A3Z420110912 [https://perma.cc/F2CN-5USJ].  In 2011, JPMorgan 
Chase & Co.’s CEO Jamie Dimon received media attention after calling the Basel 
Committee “anti-American,” long after Dodd-Frank was enacted and Basel III was 
underway.  Id.  
128 BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009). 
129 Id. at 114 (noting human rights treaties are not self-enforcing, but to ensure 
compliance, they should focus on how they influence domestic policies.). 
130 See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance–and Not 
Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623 (2011), https://academic.oup.com/jiel/article-ab-
stract/13/3/623/875000?redirectedFrom=PDF [https://perma.cc/G8JF-HBQP].  
Christopher Brummer has advocated this perspective, describing domestic super-
visory sanctions as giving “soft law” a “hard edge” in international finance.  How-
ever, he also describes this “hard edge” as a “name-and-shame” strategy, which 
dramatically understates the ability of domestic regulators in a financial center to 
punish non-compliant institutions.  Within the Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money 
Laundering (“BSA/ALM”) space, for example, a bank that fails to enact or abide by 
robust policies can incur civil money penalties, revocation of their operating license, 
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Consider, for example, the practical options that Finland might 
have if it learned the Federal Reserve was letting U.S. banks bypass 
Basel Committee capital requirements.  Barring any domestic legal 
restrictions, Finland could ease its own capital restrictions to boost 
the short-term profitability of its domestic banks, hoping they 
would take business from the Americans—or, more powerfully, it 
could bar its banks from doing business with U.S. financial institu-
tions altogether.  However, uncovering such perfidy might be 
harder or more expensive for a less financialized, less intercon-
nected country like Finland.  The Federal Reserve can place full-time 
examiners131 inside the dollar-clearing operations of large U.S. 
banks132 and punish them for transactions with overly “risk[y]” 
countries133; Finnish regulators may lack that same luxury.  Organi-
zations like the FSB and FATF help lower those costs of discovery.  
If the other FSB members drive those costs up too much by making 
unreasonable demands, then a country like Finland could exit the 
FSB, or simply let its own banks run amok—just as Bernanke and 
Geithner worried might happen in their memoirs.134  This process of 
establishing standards, monitoring compliance, and punishing de-
fection is arcane, complex, and hard, and only regulators seem 
equipped to undertake it.  
                                               
or even criminal charges.  See, e.g., U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINES, 
PENALTIES, AND FORFEITURES FOR VIOLATIONS OF FINANCIAL CRIMES AND SANCTIONS 
REQUIREMENTS, GAO-16-297 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675987.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JZX5-MMJ3]; Dan Fitzpatrick & Scott Patterson, J.P. Morgan 
Criminal Case Could Trigger OCC Action, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304682504579156022095052420 
[https://perma.cc/22QW-5Y45]. 
131 Katy Burne, New York Fed Relocating Examiners out of Banks, WALL ST. J. (July 
28, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-fed-to-relocate-examiners-out-
of-banks-1469743624 [https://perma.cc/6C8H-M95L] (noting federal regulators 
can decide where to put its examiners at any time).   
132 Citibank, U.S. Dollar Clearing Services, (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.citi-
bank.com/tts/financial_institutions/payments/us_dollar.html 
[https://perma.cc/9VWW-BZ5C] (providing example of a banking institution that 
provides dollar clearing services). 
133 See, e.g., Fed. Fin. Inst. Examination Council, BSA/AML Risk Assessment—
Overview (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/pages_man-
ual/olm_005.htm [https://perma.cc/6CPJ-U85X] (stating the BAS/AML risks of a 
bank determine the adequacy of the risk assessment process). 
134 See BRUMMER, supra note 26, at 107–09; Bernanke, supra note 88; Geithner, 
supra note 91 (commenting that now people live in a financial environment where 
countries can no longer function independently of one another). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
  
918 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 39:3 
On the surface, then, popular domestic politics might seem to 
have no real place in international financial regulatory accords.  
However, the Dodd-Frank Act suggests that this appearance is false.  
International financial regulation is not exempt from domestic poli-
tics, but the politics that shape it are distinct from those that shape 
less technical, more popularly salient issues.  United States foreign 
policy around financial services takes many different forms—from 
FATF peer reviews and high-level G20 commitments, to domestic 
regulations that align with Basel Committee standards or enforce 
the source-of-strength doctrine, to federal legislation like Dodd-
Frank with seemingly little extraterritorial effect.  Each of these 
mechanisms constitutes a different aspect of America’s interaction 
with the world on financial regulation—and the people and institu-
tions responsible for each mechanism are different, as are their indi-
vidual preferences and institutional incentives.  Wherever these 
preferences and incentives are not perfectly aligned, politics oc-
curs—even in the absence of public attention. 
These politics—which are bureaucratic, rather than electoral—
matter greatly to international policy outcomes.  From 2008-2010, 
the U.S. President, his finance minister, and the head of his central 
bank consistently expressed their belief that multilateral solutions to 
financial regulatory problems were in their country’s best interest.  
Their stated reasons ranged from competitive equity, to efficiency, 
to simple ethics.  Whatever their reasons, however, when they exer-
cised greater control over a policy process (e.g., among the G20, 
FATF, or Basel), the outcome of that process tended to more closely 
reflect their preferences.  When they exercised less control over a 
process, like in Congress, the outcome tended to diverge from those 
preferences.  To an outside observer, the result looks haphazard: 
policies that promise foreign businesses international harmoniza-
tion and parity with domestic institutions, but which leave those 
businesses open to unique regulatory scrutiny.  Pierce the national 
veil, however, and it becomes a clearer reflection of the official pref-
erences and politics arrayed underneath. 
This account of domestic politics is consistent with another 
branch of international relations scholarship:  bureaucratic network 
theory.  Anne-Marie Slaughter, extending her original thesis on the 
topic, proposed that bureaucrats operating in similar subject areas 
routinely cooperate across international borders, either forming pol-
icy independently or facilitating closer coordination through 
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existing international institutions.135  David Zaring, building on 
Slaughter’s work, argued that “[a]gencies like the [SEC] and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board now play roles as international lawmakers, and, 
in turn, are increasingly constrained by international agreement.”136  
Post-crisis financial policy, as Zaring137 and Brummer138 have sepa-
rately written, helps corroborate Slaughter’s idea that domestic 
agencies are critical actors in international law.  However, Dodd-
Frank demonstrates how those agencies—and the people who lead 
them—are also critical agents in domestic politics.  If we are not sur-
prised by the initiative, independence, and ability of those agents to 
act abroad, we should not be surprised when they exhibit the same 
traits at home.139 
This dynamic should give succor to those concerned about the 
dearth of democratic accountability in bureaucratic networks.  For 
example, Zaring has argued “the dramatic actions of the Fed during 
the financial crisis, none of which were subject to notice, comment, 
or judicial review, revealed just how far the central bank has strayed 
from the conventional procedures of an APA-mindful domestic 
                                               
135 Anne-Marie Slaughter & David T. Zaring, Networking Goes International: An 
Update, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 211, 225 (2006), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960484 [https://perma.cc/2UE6-
69W9].  The differing ways that governmental networks operate makes it difficult 
to integrate them with international organizations; it is therefore easier to have in-
dependent networks coordinate.   
136 David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administra-
tion, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 547, 549 (2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=692764 [https://perma.cc/T2VM-T6JJ]. 
137 David T. Zaring, Financial Reform's Internationalism, 65 EMORY L.J. 1255 
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2809989 
[https://perma.cc/7QYX-WTQQ] (developing the argument that financial reform 
has rebalanced the power of international engagement from the President and dip-
lomats to independent agencies).   
138 BRUMMER, supra note 26, at 19–20. 
139 See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory 
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1356 (2003), http://digitalcom-
mons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2420&context=fss_papers 
[https://perma.cc/8ETR-PRWT].  This idea suggests a modification to Macey’s 
2003 thesis on regulatory globalization.  Macey argues that “regulatory globaliza-
tion is likely to occur when there is a significant gulf between the policy preferences 
of an administrative agency and the policy preferences of one or more of its constit-
uencies,” including other agencies, other branches of government, or regulated en-
tities.  The Dodd-Frank case suggests that divergent preferences may push officials 
(elected or bureaucratic) towards greater engagement domestically, if others in 
government prefer international engagement. 
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agency.”140  However, the outcomes these agencies reach are limited 
by the process that creates them, in which different actors, with dif-
ferent preferences, hold different amounts of authority at different 
times.  Thus, there are many ways a concerned party could influence 
the exercise and distribution of that authority—not just at the federal 
level, (before Congress, agencies, and departments) or the suprana-
tional level (in, for example, comment letters to the Basel Commit-
tee), but at the state and local level, on issues like the scope and re-
quirements of a state banking charter.  The more institutionally 
diverse the process, the greater the chance domestic actors have to 
intervene, and the more electoral politics can influence or supersede 
bureaucratic politics, well before the water’s edge. 
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